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Abstract The aim of this paper is to investigate how new rules and practices in
multilateral, regional and bilateral trade negotiations related to the services industries
can be adopted and implemented at the business level, using the recently concluded
free-trade agreement (FTA) negotiations between the EU and Singapore as an illustra-
tive case. The purpose is to put the services sector into the larger framework of business
service interaction between the EU and the outside world by identifying crucial sub-
sectors within the services industries and their relations to physical, ‘visible’ production
and trade. Furthermore, to assess the prospects of ‘multilateralising’ regional trade
agreements within the service sector, through the ambitions by both parties to make
bilateral and interregional FTAs and EPAs more compatible and mutually comparable
with the multilateral GATS’ rules. The EU-Singapore FTA is an agreement that became
a ‘second-best’ solution of the stalled interregional EU-ASEAN negotiation, taking
place 2006–2009. It can nevertheless be seen as a ‘WTO-plus’ endeavour, since it aims
at reaching beyond what is under negotiation in the likewise stalled Doha Development
Agenda within the WTO framework, particularly in the fields of business services,
public procurement, intellectual property rights, trade-related investment measures,
and, generally, competition rules. Since both parties already apply low or zero tariffs
in most sectors of manufacturing, the main issues in the negotiations were related to
services in general and knowledge-intensive business services in particular, with an
emphasis on technical barriers to trade. To what extent will there be a true mutual
opening up of the service markets between the two parties as a result of the agreement,
and what technical and mental barriers remain? This FTA, if successfully implemented,
can also pave the way for a revitalisation of the ‘paused’ EU-ASEAN talks, in which
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issues related to services were most controversial. Furthermore, it should also be seen in
the global context of parallel and overlapping existing agreements or proposed talks,
e.g. FTAAP, RCEP, TTIP and TPP, as well as the plurilateral TiSA initiative. In this
respect, it can also be considered a test of the EU ‘Global Europe’ initiative, launched
in 2006, and its follow-up communications from the Commission—the latest so far by
the ‘Trade-for-All’ document in October 2015. The paper takes a combined policy- and
firm-level approach, by investigating the already reached as well as the potential future
impacts by the actors at both sides of the agreement through interviews with diplomatic
officials representing EU, ASEAN and separate member-states within both parties, as
well as with EU-originated service firms operating in Singapore. A major conclusion is
that the business sector sees little direct impact of the future FTA, and that most
companies stick to an ‘ad-hoc’ approach to meet and to overcome trade barriers rather
than building a comprehensive strategy regarding how to behave after that the agree-
ment has come into force. On the other hand, most companies are positive to the
agreement as such but would welcome resumed EU-ASEAN talks, since the most
troublesome remaining barriers are related to doing business with neighbouring coun-
tries in the region, using Singapore as the hub for transfer of knowledge-based services.
Background and objective
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of how new rules and
practises related to the services industries in multilateral, regional and bilateral trade
negotiations are received at the business level, using the recently concluded compre-
hensive free-trade agreement (FTA) negotiations between the EU and Singapore
(EUSFTA) as an illustrative case.1 Services with different levels of knowledge content
have continuously become more important for emerging economies in East and
Southeast Asia and are seen to be a vital part of the economic transformation in the
region (ADB 2012, 2014, p. 47ff). The services sector should in this respect be put into
the larger framework of business interaction between the EU and the outside world by
identifying crucial sub-sectors within the services industries and their relations to
physical, ‘visible’ trade.
The decision by the UK to commence exit negotiations from the EU in April 2017,
following the results of the referendum in June 2016, will affect the implementation of
an EUSFTA in several ways. From a Singaporean perspective, the EU market area
covered by the agreement will decrease by 17% and by that reduce its potential
benefits. The UK has traditionally also been the most important trade and investment
partner for Singapore within the EU, even though its role has substantially declined
over the years. Furthermore, the UK share of Singapore’s trade with the EU is higher in
1 For full text, see ‘EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement. Authentic text’ as of May 2015. Brussels, 29
June 2015. European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade 2015a. http://trade.ec.europa.
eu/doclib/docs/2013/september/tradoc_151729.pdf. Even though the negotiations were declared concluded
in December 2012, and officially completed in October 2014, after investment provisions had been added to
the agreement, there is at the time of writing (October 2016) some time remaining until the FTAwill come into
practical operation. Following frequent EU-internal discussions between the Commission and EU member
states on the division of competence in the EU’s FTAs, the Commission in October 2014 decided to request an
opinion from the EU Court of Justice on the competence to sign and ratify a trade agreement with Singapore.
A hearing was held in September 2016 and the final ruling by the Court is expected in the spring of 2017.
Only thereafter can the agreement be provisionally applied (if so agreed) and enter into force.
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services than in goods, which means that the service sector parts of the EUSFTAwill be
more affected than manufacturing after the UK’s exit. From the UK perspective, on the
other hand, a new bilateral trade agreement with Singapore has to be negotiated
separately after a formal exit in 2019–2020, a process that presumably will take several
years to conclude. However, since the uncertainty regarding the scope and compass of
UK’s separation from the EU will last for the next years, notably concerning its
continuous participation in the single internal market as well as in the customs union,
this paper treats UK as a still remaining member of the EU with all its benefits and
obligations.
Singapore’s total trade in services amounted to 388 billion SGD in 2014.2 This is
about 28% of its total turnover in trade in goods and services, which is slightly higher
than the world average. However, it is in Singapore’s case reasonable to deduct the re-
exports, which adds a considerable amount to total trade. When only domestic-
generated export is accounted for, the share of service trade to total trade in goods
and services increases to 34%. If, in addition, the oil trade is excluded from the figures,
Singapore’s service trade amounted to more than 55% of the Non-oil Domestic Trade
(NODT) in 2014. EU accounts for about 18% of Singapore’s trade in services, in which
Singapore runs a deficit with an export/import ratio of 0.82 in 2014, and is also
Singapore’s largest partner in service trade, exceeding USA. Accordingly, it is reason-
able to pay considerable attention to the rules and regulations around trade in services
in the EUSFTA.
Furthermore, it is relevant to assess the prospects of ‘multilateralising’ regional trade
agreements within the service sector, through the ambitions on the EU part to make
bilateral FTAs more compatible and mutually comparable with the multilateral ‘Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Services’ (GATS) rules (Baldwin 2006; Baldwin and
Thornton 2008; Baldwin et al. 2009; François and Hoekman 2010; WTO 2011;
Lindberg and Alvstam 2012a, Hamanaka 2014, p. 26ff) as well as in the parallel
plurilateral ‘Trade in Services Agreement’ (TiSA) talks, in which the EU takes part
but Singapore does not. The EUSFTA is a bilateral agreement that became the ‘second-
best’ solution of the stalled interregional EU negotiation with the ‘Association of
Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN), taking place 2007–2009. It can be seen as a
‘WTO-plus’ endeavour, since it aims at reaching beyond what is under negotiation in
the delayed ‘Doha Development Agenda’ (DDA) within the WTO framework, partic-
ularly in the fields of business services, public procurement, intellectual property rights,
trade-related investment measures and, generally, competition rules. Since both parties
already apply a low- or even zero-tariff system in most sectors of manufacturing, the
main issues in the negotiations were related to non-tariff barriers and technical barriers
to trade in services in general and knowledge-intensive business services in particular.
The research questions formulated for the study are first, to what extent will there be
a true mutual opening-up of the services markets among the affected parties, and what
technical and mental barriers remain? Second, how do the affected service sectors react
and respond to the results of the negotiations? Third, what conclusions with regard to
the theory of cross-border trade in business services can be drawn?
2 All statistical figures based in Singapore are gathered and further elaborated from the website of Singapore’s
national statistics agency, www.singstat.gov.sg, and specifically from Singapore’s International Trade in
Services 2014. Statistics based in EU are from Eurostat database, http://ec.europa.eu and from DG Trade.
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This agreement can also pave the way for a revitalisation of the interregional EU-
ASEAN talks, in which issues related to services were among the most controversial
topics during the times of active negotiations (Lindberg and Alvstam 2012b, p. 71ff). It
can be seen as a test of the EU’s ‘Global Europe’ initiative, launched in 2006, and its
follow-up communications from the Commission, the latest effort of which, the ‘Trade-
for-All’ in October 2015 (Ahnlid et al. 2011, p. 420f; European Commission 2015b).
Furthermore, the global context of parallel and overlapping current interregional
negotiations or proposed talks, e.g. TPP, TTIP, FTAAP and RCEP,3 should be taken
into consideration. Thus, the first part of the paper focuses on the larger trade policy
picture, and on the institutional framework of international trade in business services,
with a focus on the EUSFTA. The second part takes the firm-level approach, by
investigating the already reached as well as the potential future impacts by the actors
at both sides of the agreement, and relates in this respect to the ongoing positioning of
Singapore as an important service hub within the knowledge-intensive business ser-
vices in East and Southeast Asia, attracting FDI from the global and regional markets
within the larger process of ASEAN integration within the services sector (Chia 2011;
Dee 2010, 2012; Findlay 2011; Fink 2008; Fink and Molinuevo 2008; Hamanaka
2011a, b, 2014; Ishido 2011; Ishido and Fukunaga 2012; Kuroiwa and Kumagai 2011;
Roy 2012; Ström 2006).
There have been relatively few studies aiming at investigating the impact of regional
economic integration at the company level. The, to our knowledge, most comprehen-
sive and successful attempt in this direction was made by the Asian Development Bank
Institute, which collected detailed information in a major survey during 2007–2009,
resulting in a database of over 800 manufacturing export companies in East Asia
(Kawai and Wignaraja 2011b). Further surveys during 2011–2012 expanded the
database to include over 1000 firms and concluded that one third of them were using
the available FTA preferences (Kawai and Wignaraja 2013, p. 20). The results from the
ADBI study have been used as a natural platform for this paper. It should be noted,
however, that their work was primarily focused on manufacturing companies, while our
study emphasises effects on service companies with in many respects different kinds of
trade barriers.
The authors have conducted a number of interviews with the parties in the EU-
ASEAN, respectively EU-Singapore negotiations in order to identify core differences
and priorities between stakeholders. The focus of the interviews was to explore how
these differences align with the perceptions of these differences among parties con-
cerned in the business sector, and to relate these different positions to the larger
regulatory and institutional framework of service markets in ASEAN in general and
Singapore in particular. The interviews took place over a long time period, mainly
between 2010 and 2014, and covered the EU delegations in four ASEAN countries and
trade ministry officials from respective country. Previously, similar interviews had also
been conducted in both Brussels and Southeast Asia in connection with research
regarding the EU-ASEAN negotiations during the period 2007–2009 (Lindberg and
Alvstam 2009, 2012a, b). Personal interviews with companies from Europe, mainly
from Sweden and Finland, representing different service sectors, have taken place at
various occasions between 2007 and 2014 (see details in Appendix).
3 See further description of these arrangements in the following section.
78 Alvstam C. et al.
The larger trade policy picture
Whereas the multilateral trade negotiations within the framework of the DDA have
been trapped in a closed to deadlock situation for a number of years, various forms of
regional and bilateral preferential trade agreements have mushroomed in all parts of the
world. The conclusion of regional and bilateral trade agreements (RTAs and BTAs) are
traditionally considered to be a less efficient strategy for trade liberalisation, and are still
disputed in the theory of customs unions (Wong 2006). Compared with the multilateral
order, they are often accused for undermining the system itself, and are sometimes
labelled ‘spaghetti bowls’ or ‘noodle soups’, due to the large number of confusing,
complex and overlapping country-to-country constellations (Kuroda 2006; Bhagwati
2008). However, for the time being, they are here to stay, and the issue is now rather
how to make them more compatible with multilateral rules (Baldwin 2006; Hufbauer
and Schott 2009; Baldwin and Thornton 2008; Baldwin and Low 2009; Rizwanul
Islam and Alam 2009; Hillman 2010; Wignaraja and Lazaro 2010; WTO 2011;
Lindberg and Alvstam 2012a). Many of the outstanding issues in the delayed DDA
talks are related to the service sector, which has a much shorter history of being
negotiated at the multilateral level than manufacturing. It was not until the conclusion
of the Uruguay round within the GATT agreement and the inauguration of the WTO
that services in general were incorporated under the multilateral umbrella, operationally
through the GATS (Marchetti and Mavroidis 2011). Both RTAs and BTAs are allowed
for by the WTO under certain conditions. The guidelines are given in GATT’s Article
XXIV, GATS’ Article Vand the so-called Enabling Clause. GATS’ Article V states that
a regional or bilateral agreement in services must have substantial sectorial coverage (in
terms of number of sectors, volume of trade affected and modes of supply) and provide
for the absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination between or among the
parties involved. In addition, the general GATS’ articles, e.g. regarding MFN status
(Art. II), Transparency (Art. III) and Market access (Art. XVI), apply. It has to be kept
in mind that the EU Services Directive (Dir. 2006/123(EC)), which regulates the trade
in services between the member states, is generally more far-reaching than the GATS,
and obstructs in this respect the MFN principle, although this issue is addressed through
Article V.
Despite more than 15 years of implementation of the GATS, the outcome has so far
been modest. There is still a lack of common definitions and categorisations of certain
elements in the service trade, particularly how to measure and apply rules of origin,
how to account for value added of service inputs when services are embedded in the
physical products, and how to delimit services within a larger context of elements in a
general Preferential Trade Agreement. 4 Furthermore, there are a number of issues
where the GATS until now has not reached the initial ambitions to facilitate cross-
border services transactions, such as public procurement, subsidies, labour mobility,
and problems related to different competition policies. The plurilateral initiative in 2012
4 The most comprehensive documentation of applied multilateral rules in the statistical reporting of interna-
tional trade in services can be found in the Manual on Statistics of International Trade in Services 2010,
published by the Statistical Commission of the United Nations (MSITS 2010); see also the manuals on
Balance of Payments (BOP) 2008, and System of National Accounts (SNA) 2009 for the basic statistical
classifications related to the service sector, and the GATS’ classification list for services, MTN.GNS/W/120 of
10 July 1991, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_e.htm.
The service sector in the free-trade agreement 79
to launch the TiSA, incorporating the largest countries in international trade in general
and trade in services in particular can be seen as an action to push the services agenda
further. While both the EU and the USA are actively involved in these talks, Singapore
is not.5
There has, apart from TiSA, been a period of several parallel initiatives at the global
level as well as between the members of the ‘Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation’
(APEC) to launch and to accelerate broad trade and investment agreements aiming
further than what can be reached within the WTO framework. 6 Both the EU and
Singapore are deeply involved in larger ventures. This raises the question regarding the
long-term ultimate priorities of both parties. Singapore is one of twelve members of the
recently concluded, though not yet ratified nor implemented ‘Trans-Pacific Partnership’
(TPP), which has been seen as the top trade political priority from the US perspective,
while the EU and the US are at the same time negotiating a ‘Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP), also a main pillar in the external economic relations of
both parties. Since Mainland China is not a TPP partner, it has on its part re-launched
an old idea (Bergsten 2007) of a ‘Free Trade Area of Asia and the Pacific’ (FTAAP),
incorporating initially the ‘ASEAN + 6’,7 but in its extension virtually the whole 21
member APEC plus South Asia. In addition, the ten ASEAN members launched in
2012 the idea of a ‘Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership’ (RCEP) in order
to consolidate all ASEAN + 1 FTAs with six countries in the region, i.e. in reality to
create an ASEAN + 6 framework. It is also both in China’s and the ASEAN members’
joint interest to calibrate and harmonise new agreements with the existing ACFTA
(ASEAN-China FTA) framework. In addition, there are more than 50 existing bilateral
agreements in the form of FTAs and more comprehensive Economic Partnership
Agreements (EPAs) among the APEC members. In an effort to stress the unity of the
member states, China’s President Xi Jinping emphasised already at the annual APEC
meeting in November 2014 that an FTAAP ‘does not go against existing free-trade
arrangements in the region’, and should rather be seen as an ‘aggregation’ of these
arrangements. 8 The FTAAP initiative as the major instrument to further APEC’s
regional economic integration agenda was reconfirmed in the 2015 annual meeting,
while the finalisation of the TPP negotiations as a ‘possible pathway’ to the FTAAP
was ‘noted’, and the early completion of RCEP negotiations was ‘encouraged’ in the
23rd Leaders’ Declaration (www.apec.org. 2015 Leaders’ Declaration. Manila, 19
November 2015). It is widely agreed that interregional as well as regional
preferential trade agreements would improve and consolidate the increasing
importance of Asian countries in ever more tightly connected global and regional
5 At the time of writing (October 2016), 23 parties are involved in the ongoing negotiations, representing 70%
of world service trade. Since the European Union itself represents 28 member states, the initiative covers 50
WTO members (European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade 2016a, b, c).
6 APEC can, despite the fact that it has no role as a formal negotiation body, be seen as an important ‘testing
ground’ for initiatives that later can be brought forward in other fora. Its Business Advisory Council offers
moreover a natural platform for interaction between policymakers and MNEs. APEC also includes a couple of
actors, e.g. Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan (Chinese Taipei) that are not formal participants in other regional
talks. Taiwan is, though, participant in a number of BTAs, including with Singapore.
7 The ten ASEAN members plus Mainland China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India.
8 When speaking at the dialogue between the APEC leaders and representatives of the APEC Business
Advisory Council. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-11/10/c_133779321.htm, 10 November
2014.
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production networks in a number of advanced manufacturing industries, e.g.
automotive, telecommunications, electronics and pharmaceuticals, all comprising
increasing levels of embedded service value added, arisen within ASEAN, as well as
in the East Asian region as a whole (Athukorala 2011; François and Wignaraja 2008;
Hiratsuka 2011; Hufbauer and Schott 2009; Kawai and Wignaraja 2011a, b, 2013;
WTO 2011). From this theoretical starting point, all initiatives should be seen as
positive steps, although complex ‘PTA competition’ between various, often overlap-
ping country constellations may at the same time become a hurdle in itself towards the
widely accepted need for further trade liberalisation, not least in the services sector.
One outstanding issue from the very beginning of the BTA negotiations with
Singapore was whether other ASEAN states would follow suit, and, in such a case,
in which sequence? Malaysia and Vietnam were those countries that already in 2009
commenced preliminary talks in the form of ‘scoping exercises’. Formal negotiations
with Malaysia were launched in October 2010 and with Vietnam in June 2012. 9
Malaysia has been the obvious second runner after Singapore, since it ranks second
in terms of the turnover value of goods and services and enjoys in many sectors free
access to Singapore, but maintains relatively high tariff rates and keeps a complex tariff
schedule (Drzeniek Hanouz and Geiger 2010, p. 38). These negotiations have, how-
ever, not proceeded along with the expected timetable and were put on hold in April
2012 at Malaysia’s request. Vietnam, on the other hand, was expected to lag behind,
despite vast improvements in the trade environment, not least due to the recent WTO
accession, which led to significant liberalisation of trade in goods and services over the
phase-in period to 2012 (Drzeniek Hanouz and Geiger 2010, p. 46), but turned out to be
a more ambitious partner, and the negotiations were concluded in December 2015.
Pending Council decision and EU Parliament consent early 2017, it is expected that the
agreement can enter into force in 2018. After a scoping exercise with Thailand, formal
negotiations were launched in March 2013 (see footnote 11), but have, similarly to
Malaysia, been brought to a ‘pause’. The last round so far took place in April 2014.
Negotiations with the Philippines were launched in December 2015 with a first round
in May 2016. The first round with Indonesia took place in September 2016. The
ultimate ambition from the EU side has been to integrate the coming bilateral deals
into an interregional trade agreement, according to the initial ambitions from 2006. One
of the problems related to the 2007–2009 talks regarding the political concerns with
individual ASEAN members, notably Burma/Myanmar, leading to the ‘ASEAN minus
X’ debate (Lindberg and Alvstam 2012b), may have become less sensitive with the
opening up of a reform process in the country since 2011. The ambition to resume an
interregional agreement with the entire ASEAN was further emphasised in the com-
munication ‘Trade-for-All’ (European Commission 2015b, p. 31f).
The UK initiation of leaving the EU, following the referendum in June 2016, will
have both a direct and an indirect impact on the EUSFTA. Before the UK’s formal exit,
expected to take place in 2019–2020 at the earliest, the country remains within not only
this agreement, but within all other ongoing EUSFTA negotiations with Asian countries
as well as in the current TTIP talks. Even though the UK will still remain within the
union for the immediate years, and will also not be able to initiate any separate formal
9 For further reference, see the updated list of the current situation regarding EU’s Free Trade Agreements,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf (accessed 4 October 2016).
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bilateral FTA talks with any partner before it legally leaves, it is reasonable to expect
that its future exit will indirectly have an impact on all current EU negotiations, in
which the respective counterparts will assess potential benefits and shortcomings of an
agreement in which UK will not participate.
In summary, the EU-Singapore FTA should be viewed in a larger global and regional
trade policy context. Its future realisation will be directly related to two main scenarios:
First, in a situation when the TPP and/or TTIP might fail to be concluded in the near
future, and the FTAAP/RCEP initiatives still reflect long-term ambitions rather than
short-term action, the EUSFTA can function as a miniature role model of how a
comprehensive trade and investment partnership can be designed at a larger scale,
e.g. in an interregional agreement between the EU and ASEAN. Second, if the TPP and
TTIP negotiations will eventually be successfully finalised, the main ambition of an
EUSFTA will be to secure that this agreement is not only equalling the standards of
TPP and TTIP, but that it also should aim at proceeding further beyond a ‘WTO-Plus’
framework.
EU-ASEAN trade relations and ASEAN trade in goods and services
Despite a rapid pace of growth of trade between the EU and the ten ASEAN members,
in goods as well as in services, over the last decade, the relative importance of the
economic relations between the EU and ASEAN, measured in terms of shares of world
trade values, has deteriorated or stagnated (Tables 1 and 2). Seen in the longer time
perspective, after the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, the initial even balance of
trade in goods between the two parties changed into a growing trade deficit, seen from
the EU perspective, caused by stagnating and declining exports of the EU to ASEAN
countries as an effect of currency depreciations among several member states and the
need to reduce budget deficits in the region. This imbalance has not been restored
thereafter. The relative decline of the EU-ASEAN trade relations is in the first place a
reflection of the higher pace of growth in intra-ASEAN trade, as well as the intensified
economic relations between the ASEAN countries and other states in the Asian realm,
with the exception of Japan. Mainland China has in recent years replaced Japan as the
Table 1 The relative importance of EU-ASEAN trade in goods 2005–2014 (percentages)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Share of EU in ASEAN exports 12.7 12.8 12.7 11.9 11.5 11.1 10.7 10.1 9.9 10.3
Share of EU in ASEAN imports 10.3 10.1 10.7 9.9 10.8 9.4 9.5 9.7 9.8 9.3
Share of EU in ASEAN trade 11.6 11.6 11.7 10.9 11.2 10.3 10.1 9.9 9.8 9.8
Share of ASEAN in EU total exp. 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.6
Share of ASEAN in EU total imp. 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.2
Share of ASEAN in EU total trade 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9
Share of ASEAN in EU extra exp. 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.6 4.6 4.4 4.9 4.6 4.6
Share of ASEAN in EU extra imp. 6.1 5.6 5.6 5.0 5.5 5.7 5.5 5.6 5.8 6.2
Share of ASEAN in EU extra trade 5.2 5.0 5.0 4.7 5.1 5.2 5.0 5.3 5.2 5.4
Source: Elaborated from IMF DOTS Database, November 11, 2014; DOTS Quarterly, December 2015
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main trading partner of ASEAN and is expected to consolidate this position even more
in the near future. The trend of stagnating or decreasing shares in the EU trade is typical
for other parts of Asia as well. The colonial legacy of a close network of business
relations, often emanating from the demand of tropical natural resources and an
asymmetric exchange of raw materials with final consumer goods, is thus since long
a memory of the past, although the UK and the Netherlands do still account for the
lion’s share of the EU’s total trade relations with South and Southeast Asia. The UK
was the dominant trade partner to Singapore in the past, and accounted for about 30%
of the total turnover in trade in goods in 1975, but its share has 40 years later declined
to about 13%, with a particularly sharp decrease of the shares in UK exports to
Singapore. In terms of values, these flows have subsequently been surpassed by
Germany, the Netherlands, France and Belgium in recent years. The previous bilateral
surplus between the UK and Singapore as late as 10 years ago has shifted to a deficit.
The export/import ratio in 2014 amounted to 0.75 (IMF 2016b).
Instead the main new feature in the external trade pattern, intra- as well as inter-
regionally, has been the emergence of complex networks of highly specialised and
spatially dispersed production of semi-manufactured inputs, parts and components,
resulting in what is usually labelled ‘intermediate trade’. A recent estimate shows that
the intermediate trade accounts for about 60% of global trade values (UNCTAD 2013,
p. 122). Depending on various statistical definitions of these transactions, this figure
varies. A broader definition would presumably result in even higher shares. One
phenomenon within the larger context of intermediate trade is the growing significance
of ‘intra-industry trade’, representing exchange of goods and services within identical
or almost identical categories. Intermediate and intra-industry trade can be observed
within ‘intra-firm’, as well as ‘inter-firm’ networks, where the rising trend towards
increasing shares of intra-firm trade, operated within transnational corporations, has
recently been challenged by the parallel trend towards outsourcing and offshoring of
separate elements in the global value chain—GVC (Feenstra 1998; Gereffi et al. 2005;
Johnson and Noguera 2012; UNCTAD 2013). The EU represents a case with a higher
share of foreign value added in exports, compared to the global level—39% and 28%,
Table 2 The relative importance of EU-ASEAN trade in services 2005–2014 (percentages)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Share of EU in ASEAN exports 11.9 11.4 10.0 9.8 9.9 9.3 9.8 9.7 9.6 9.8
Share of EU in ASEAN imports 10.9 11.4 11.6 10.1 11.4 10.7 9.7 9.3 10.6 11.5
Share of EU in ASEAN trade 11.4 11.4 10.8 10.0 10.7 10.0 9.8 9.5 10.1 10.6
Share of ASEAN in EU total exp. 1.6 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.8 2.1 2.1
Share of ASEAN in EU total imp. 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.7 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.1
Share of ASEAN in EU total trade 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.1
Share of ASEAN in EU extra exp. 3.9 4.1 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.0 4.6 4.7
Share of ASEAN in EU extra imp. 4.1 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.3 4.8 5.0 4.0 4.0 3.9
Share of ASEAN in EU extra trade 4.0 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.6 4.0 4.3 4.3
Source: Elaborated from Eurostat database, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu; accessed 9 February 2016;
ASEANStats Database, accessed 9 February 2016. Figures regarding Brunei, Laos and Vietnam have been
estimated. EU mirror data have been used to calculate the shares of total ASEAN service trade
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respectively (UNCTAD 2013, p. 127, 2010 figures), while Singapore is an example of
an extremely high GVC participation rate—82% of Singapore’s export is related to a
global multi-stage process, compared with 64% in Germany and 45% in the USA
(UNCTAD 2013, p. 132).10 When it comes to the trade measured by the value added,
which gives a better picture of the actual participation of a country in the larger global
value chain than the traditional gross value measure, it is notable that the UK share of
Singapore’s trade in services with the EU has increased between 1995 and 2011
(OECD-WTO 2016). This observation indicates that the role of British service firms
in the Singaporean relations with the EU is still strong.
In this context, the value added of services is normally either embedded into the
larger sector of manufacturing production and trade in goods, or exhibited as a separate
sector of service production and exports. This ambiguity has always been a matter of
concern in the analysis of the role of services in the multilateral trade order, despite
decades of attempts to find and adopt a universally accepted solution. In the meanwhile,
the value added of pure services as a share of the gross output value of physical
production has continued to rise, at the same time as there has also been a major global
shift of the geographical location of services value added from Europe and North
America in the direction of Asia, although with a time-lag compared with the similar
development regarding the manufacturing value added. The share of foreign value-
added exports in the services sectors is normally much lower than in manufacturing
(UNCTAD 2013, p. 128).11 There has in general terms been a shift from low- to high-
value-added service sectors in the EU-ASEAN trade, e.g. from transport and storage to
a complex mix of advanced professional business services. This is an area of particular
importance and strength for the UK economy, where several firms are using Singapore
as an important location for East and Southeast Asia.
While the EU-ASEAN bilateral trade in goods is characterised by a deficit as seen
from the EU perspective, the reverse situation is typical in the field of services. The
merchandise accounts for about 80% of the total bilateral trade turnover of goods and
services. The export/import ratio regarding goods between the EU and ASEAN was in
average 0.74 during the period 2010/2014, representing an annual average EU deficit of
about 32 billion USD. The corresponding ratio in the field of services was at the same
time 1.1, representing an EU surplus at about 3 billion USD/year in absolute terms.
There is from the ASEAN perspective a slow but steady declining EU importance also
in the service sector, while the shares of ASEAN in the total EU trade in services show
a slight growth, although from a much lower level (Table 2). This trend is in the
statistical reporting not incorporating the value-added in services embedded in pre-
dominant manufacturing companies, why the ‘real’ service value-added presumably
has grown at an even higher pace.
Being the economically largest member state of ASEAN, Singapore’s own devel-
opment is crucial for the entire region. Between 35% and 40% of EU’s exports of goods
10 GVC participation is measured by adding to the foreign value used in a country’s own exports also the value
added supplied to other countries’ exports. The sum is divided by total export value. This quota can further be
disaggregated in an upstream and downstream component, respectively, indicating whether domestic pro-
ducers of value added are situated late vs. early in the global value chain. The concept was developed in
Koopman et al. (2011).
11 According to the UNCTAD study, the share of foreign value added in the tertiary sector was 14%, compared
with 29% in the secondary sector (UNCTAD 2013, p. 128)—2010 figures.
84 Alvstam C. et al.
to ASEAN has been reported with Singapore as country of destination during the last
10 years, while the corresponding share of Singaporean origin of imports from ASEAN
to the EU has varied between 20% and 25%. There is a slight, although clearly visible
trend that Singapore’s share is about to decline, which is a natural effect of the
ambitions of other member states to take a more direct position in the interregional
trade with Europe and North America. However, this trend is more typical for the
manufacturing sector rather than in services, where Singapore still keeps a strong lead.
Singapore accounts at present for 40–45% of the total ASEAN imports and exports
respectively of commercial services, and its position has furthermore become stronger
during the past decade. Singapore’s service balance has varied considerably over the
years. There was a strong tendency towards a growing surplus during the 10 years from
the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, followed by a long period of diminishing of the gap
and a couple of years in the 2000s until 2009 when a deficit was accounted. During the
last years a modest deficit has been reported. The other major ASEAN countries show
normally negative service balances, with a particularly widening deficit in Thailand.
The EU share of Singapore’s trade in services has remained stable during the last
10 years with around 13–16% of the total services trade (Table 3). In absolute figures,
there has since 2010 been a small deficit, as viewed from the Singaporean side, with an
export/import ratio with the EU amounting to about 0.97 (2014).
A categorisation of the sub-groups in Singapore’s total trade in services when it
comes to the change of relative importance in 2005/2009 compared with 2010/2014, as
well as their cumulated surplus or deficit during 2005–2014, is featured in Fig. 1.12 The
three largest categories, ‘Transport’, ‘Travel’ and ‘Other Business Services’ represent
together 72% of total service trade in 2010/2014, compared to 75% in 2005/2009. The
main reason for the decline is the decreased importance of transport services, while the
other groups have grown in relative terms. On the other hand, the transport sector
generates a surplus, which the two other main sectors do not. The next two important
sectors are financial services and charges for the use of intellectual property. Both are
increasing in importance, but where trade in financial services generates a large surplus,
the IPR charges give rise to a huge deficit. The large group ‘Other business services’
can further be disaggregated in sub-groups (Fig. 2), in which it is revealed that the
dominant group ‘Business management’ generates the largest cumulated surplus be-
tween 2005 and 2014 and is also growing in importance, while trade-related business
services and R&D related services account for large deficits. A similar picture of the
cumulated balance between Singapore and EU with a different classification and
primary data is exhibited in Table 4.
Within ASEAN as a whole, there are striking differences between countries as well
as between exports and imports. ASEAN reports a large deficit in transport services, a
surplus in travel and a deficit in other commercial services. While Singapore, as was
mentioned above, accounts for a robust surplus in maintenance and repair services,
transport, finance, business management, accounting, advertising/market research,
12 Due to differences in the compilation of primary sources, generally between survey and administrative data,
and also between different methods and classification categories in the conducted surveys, there are slight
differences between various secondary data publications and databases by the Department of Statistics. This
paper has used a mix of data presented in Singapore’s International Trade in Services, 2014, and the statistical
tables derived from the tablebuilder database; see further the technical notes in SITS 2014:15ff and www.
singstat.gov.sg; special survey.
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architectural, engineering/technical and legal services, and reports a huge deficit in IPR-
related payments, travel, insurance, R&D and trade-related services, Thailand on the
other hand reports a considerable surplus in travel services that does not compensate for
the vast deficits in transport and other commercial services. A similar picture is shown
in the case of Malaysia. There is, accordingly, a high degree of complementarity
between Singapore and its ASEAN neighbours when it comes to trade in services.
This complementarity is partly created through Singapore’s sometimes self-imposed
role of being the hub for advanced business services in Southeast Asia, but it does also
reflect the potential of a deeper division of labour within ASEAN member states, and
the opportunities to resume the interregional EU-ASEAN FTA talks, when the ‘pilot
cases’ of Singapore and Vietnam are to be implemented.
Singapore as a service hub in Asia
As part of the strategy to connect to the global market through free trade and FDI, the
Singaporean government has put extensive effort into building a foundation for a
knowledge-based economy. The economic transformation has accelerated over the last
decades, by moving from a manufacturing-based to a service-based economy. The
Singapore case shows the importance of the service economy for emerging markets in
order to increase their competitiveness and welfare creation (World Bank 2012). The
strategy has involved upgrading the local economy by strengthening the human capital
through continuous investments in education. The awareness of the importance of
highly educated human capital for the development of high order services has put
Singapore ahead of many other emerging markets (Jensen 2013). The aim has also been
to enhance the possibility for value creation and the connection of advanced
manufacturing and services, which is an important part of connecting to global and
regional production networks (Shepherd and Pasadilla 2012). Industries, such as
advanced information technology, telecom, biotech and potential green application of
advanced manufacturing and service production, are all important sectors for the future
(Masuyama and Vandenbrink 2003; Ström 2006; Aldaba and Pasadilla 2010). These
industries are furthermore supported by Singapore’s highly developed and efficient
transportation and logistics services that, by themselves, are also key drivers of
economic integration (Fujita et al. 2011, p. 3).
The positive attitude towards creating better opportunities for service trade and FDI
is well in line with Singapore’s long-term strategy. The aim has been to become a
Table 3 The relative importance of Singapore-EU trade in services 2005–2014 (percentages)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
EU’s share of Singapore’s exports 13.5 14.0 14.6 16.6 16.4 15.1 15.0 13.7 14.4 13.7
EU’s share of Singapore’s imports 14.4 16.4 14.7 16.7 15.4 16.4 16.7 16.0 17.8 15.9
Source: Elaborated from Singapore’s international trade in services tablebuilder: www.singstat.gov.sg;
accessed 9 February 2016
Note: There are slight differences between secondary data sources, due to different compilation methods, see
also footnote 15
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knowledge and service hub in Southeast Asia (Ström 2006). Singapore is one of the
forerunners within Southeast Asia to acknowledge the importance of the service
industry for creating sustained economic growth. In this context, many countries in
Asia have mainly been focusing on facilitating the manufacturing side of the economy,
and the potential of services has been left out in developing market integration.
Productivity within the service industry has also been lower compared with
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Source: Authors’ elaborations, based on oficial Singaporean trade statistics
Fig. 1 Singapore’s trade balance and development of shares of total service trade with EU28 between all sub-
sectors of services 2005–2014
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manufacturing in Asia, and it is a potential to utilise the growth of services to offset the
loss of momentum for the manufacturing industry (Noland et al. 2012). The free market
and open attitude has attracted FDI in many different sectors. Singapore has become an
important regional hub for services in general and knowledge-intensive business
services in particular. The latter includes various financial services that have become
an integral part of the economy for supporting economic integration in the region






























Fig. 2 Singapore’s service trade balance and development of shares of total service trade with EU28 between
sub-sectors of ‘Other Business Services’, 2005–2014
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(Ström and Yoshino 2009). Some of the firms in financial services have also grown to
be among the largest companies in ASEAN, such as three Singaporean banks that are
second only to Singapore Telecommunications by market capitalisation (ASEAN
Investment Report 2015, p. xviii). The strategy to establish Singapore as a service
and knowledge hub involves different parts. One of the most fundamental aspects is to
offer a well-functioning regulatory environment that facilitates and protects knowledge
IPR. This has proven to be an important factor for attracting new types of firms where
the business models are mainly based on different Internet applications.
The geographic location in the region has also endowed Singapore with a competitive
advantage, creating a centre point for business venturing out to surrounding part of
ASEAN. However, with the growth of China and the rise of other knowledge and
service hubs, such as Shanghai, Beijing and Hong Kong, the Singaporean strategy is
challenged (Yeh and Yang 2013).With increasing business activity in North East Asia, it
has been evident for Singapore that the government needs to work even harder in order
to continuously attract regional headquarters of MNEs from Asia, Europe and North
America and facilitate the development of knowledge-intensive service industries.
Singapore has been highly successful in attracting investments from MNEs in the
region, mainly from Japan, but also from the US and Europe. The open environment
has also attracted firms to utilise Singapore as a service hub for the region. Originating
from the most developed country in East Asia, Japanese investments in regional
production networks and financing have been one of the most important growth
facilitators. At an early stage, Singapore became a vital hub in Southeast Asia for
Japanese investments in manufacturing and trading activities, and has later developed
into a major hub also for Japanese service investments and localisation of company
operations (Hamanaka 2011a, b). Singapore’s free-trade agreement with Japan has
further facilitated this growth in service FDI. Empirical studies of Japanese service
FDI clearly show the importance of the combination of location and institutional or
regulatory environment for the choice of Singapore. Companies with the knowledge-
intensive service industry state that Singapore is an attractive location for developing
and supporting the client base in the region (Ström 2006; Ström and Yoshino 2009).
However, with an increasing liberalisation of service trade and the move of production
networks to China, they also see Hong Kong and Shanghai as potential competitors.
When firms evaluated a second regional base outside Japan, the choice was often
Singapore or Hong Kong due to the favourable institutional environment. It is in this
larger context that the recently concluded EU-Singapore FTA negotiations should be
assessed and evaluated.
The EU-Singapore free-trade negotiations and related development
in the region
Shortly after the parties in the EU-ASEAN FTA negotiations agreed to take a pause in
2009, the original two-year-deadline for the negotiations was reached. It was time for
reflections on and an evaluation of the achievements made so far, not only for the EU-
ASEAN process, but also for all the FTA negotiations that had been launched in 2007.
It was then concluded that alternative routes were necessary, since the region-to-region
process had not delivered. Hence, it was agreed that the EU would now be ready to
90 Alvstam C. et al.
engage in bilateral negotiations with individual ASEAN members, as long as their level
of ambition matched that of the EU.
The EUmember states gave therefore in December 2009 the Commission green light
to pursue negotiations towards BTAs with individual countries, starting with Singapore
(Press release from the European Commission, DG Trade, 22 December 2009
(http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=504). The first round of
negotiations took place in March 2010, with the ambition to conclude them by mid-
2011. This ‘pilot’ BTA initiative has served as a good first example of how the two
regions could be more closely related, and to keep the door open to a renewed
comprehensive region-to-region agreement in the future. It shall furthermore be seen
in the light of the trade agreements Singapore has been developing with e.g. China,
Japan and the US, both as a separate nation and, in the cases of China and Japan, also
within the framework of ASEAN. It was furthermore important for the EU to show the
commitment towards Singapore, being an important regional hub for trade and produc-
tion of goods and services. The issue of the growing importance for trade with China
within the ASEAN region and the establishment of the ACFTA, as well as Singapore’s
participation in the TPP, further strengthened the incentive from the EU side to engage in
trade talks to secure a favourable position for European firms in the region. The
characteristic feature of the Singaporean economy is its low formal barriers to trade,
its role as an entrepôt point for East and Southeast Asia as a whole, its continuous
upgrading of domestic production to contain ever higher value-added of manufacturing
as well as service inputs, and its high pace of economic transformation in general. The
trade-weighted applied tariff rate amounts to almost zero (Drzeniek Hanouz and Geiger
2010, p. 42). The Singaporean government and related agencies have worked hard
during the last decade to develop and establish the city state as an important knowledge
and service hub in Southeast Asia, making use of the liberal attitude towards free trade
and FDI (Masuyama and Vandenbrink 2003; Hamanaka 2011a, b). Despite these efforts
and the high integration ambitions reflected in the ASEAN Economic Community
(AEC) 2015 scheme, many technical barriers remain, though, between the member
states (Dee 2012; Severino and Menon 2013; Sally 2013; ADB 2014, p. 22ff). There is
also a widespread reluctance among Singapore’s neighbours to give the island-state an
even more dominant role as the business hub for the entire region.
After almost 3 years of negotiations, the two parties completed the deal in December
2012 (Interviewwith an official at an EU delegation in Singapore, November 2014). It can
be seen as one of the most comprehensive FTA that the EU has ever negotiated, and goes
in several aspects beyondwhat is on the table in the DDA process. In particular, this relates
to the services sector, such as environmental services, engineering and architectural
services, postal services, maritime transport and computer services, but also regarding
public procurement and abolition of a number of technical barriers to trade in goods and
services, e.g. the mutual recognition of technical and safety standards. In certain fields of
financial services, e.g. wealth management, wholesale banking, investment banking and
insurance, the results did not reach as far as the EU side had originally aimed at, but the
final agreement contains commitments which are at least at the same level as what the US
obtained in its FTAwith Singapore (Facts and Figures: EU trade agreement with Singa-
pore. Press release 16 December 2012; http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO12-
993_en.htm, accessed on 9 April 2013). The investment talks were concluded in October
2014, thus completing the entire agreement as such. However, a potential obstacle
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regarding the future implementation will be the fact that the entire agreement has been put
to the Court of Justice in order to clarify the interpretation of the Lisbon Treaty when it
comes to the competence of the Commission and the Council respectively to sign and to
ratify an FTA (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1185, 30October 2014
). This process may take a considerable time.
Issues related to services in the bilateral negotiations between the EU and ASEAN
members
There have basically been two approaches adopted by leading economies in negotiating
services with ASEAN countries, using Singapore as the ‘pilot case’. The US approach
was to compile a ‘negative’ list, i.e. to reveal what is not included, while the EU
negotiation strategy was to commence from a ‘positive’ list, i.e. to record what is
included, and thereafter gradually approach those sectors where problems remain
(Interview with an official at an EU delegation in Southeast Asia, March 2010). Both
ways contain advantages and disadvantages. The use of the negative list gives an
informal signal to sectors without outstanding problems that actors related to these
sectors may continue to implement measures of trade liberalisation without any further
delay, and thus speeding up the process. On the other hand, the use of a list of remaining
problem sectors could slow down the pace in these sectors, and minor technical issues in
peripheral sectors may become hurdles for proceeding with more relevant and wide-
ranging problems. The EU approach on the other hand gives a formal green light case by
case to sectors of unanimity, but threatens to put off problem areas to a distant future and
thus to defer an ultimate solution. In addition, the EU negotiation strategy to adopt a very
ambitious approach along with the idea to conclude ‘comprehensive and ambitious third
millennium FTAs’, as described above, goes in many aspects further than what has been
put forward at the multilateral level in the DDA talks, and became in this respect an
obstacle itself towards proceeding to the core negotiation agenda in goods and services.
Such an approach was disputed also from the EU side (Interview with an official at an
EU delegation in Southeast Asia, March 2010. It should be mentioned, though, that the
‘negative list’ approach was later adopted in the EU negotiations regarding a Compre-
hensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada (CETA)).
The main problem areas can be summarised in, among others, the following
categories:
& Adaptation of rules of origin (ROOs) to take the real value added of services input
into account;
& Location of service value added; mobility of production and consumption;
& Elimination and/or reduction of technical barriers to trade (TBTs);
& Adjustment of rules related to the international provision of services within the
public sector in different countries; government procurement.
Rules of origin
The traditional operational implementations of ROOs, as they have developed through
the common tariff schedules in the multilateral trading system over the years, have been
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to use the shift of statistical classification in the tariff line of a physical commodity to
represent a shift of the country of origin. It is at the same time assumed that the shift in
commodity classification has been caused by a substantial transformation of the
product. Such a method is based on the assumption that the physical product changes
its shape in the value-added process. The value added of various forms of service
inputs, be they upstream, onstream or downstream, are literally and figuratively much
subtler, and more difficult to assess and to measure; accordingly, they are not always
resulting in a visible transformation of the product. Subsequently, the value contribu-
tion of service inputs is usually underrated in production and trade statistics.13 As long
as the services value added to the gross value of the product were marginal or modest at
best, the problem of changed/unchanged statistical classification did not have any high
impact on trade practises by national customs authorities. However, with an increasing
share of services in the gross output value of the final physical product, and the pure
service product itself, the input of services determines to an increasing extent the
country of origin, and, thus, the rules regarding how a certain commodity should be
treated. This is particularly the case, now that ‘multilateral cumulation’, i.e. the
compound value added of the final product derived in many countries, has become
the normality rather than an exception. Examples of services sectors that are particu-
larly contributing to a ‘concealed’ value added in physical products are to be found
within research and development, IPR charges, design, general management consulting
services, quality control and various financial services, but almost all sectors provide
cases in the same direction.14
Although Singapore is an example of a country with an extremely high degree of
trade liberalisation, the issue of how to define Singaporean origin in imports to the EU
and other parts of the world, and vice versa, has become a problem. Since a fair share of
Singaporean exports in goods as well as in services, consists of products in transit or
‘quasi-transit’,15 it can be assumed that the reported value is biased. This error can,
though, arise in both directions, i.e. in either over- or underrating the value of
Singaporean exports/imports. In both cases, this causes a problem in the BTA negoti-
ations for a country like Singapore. For other members of ASEAN, the effects may
occur in the reverse context, e.g. in such a case when domestic goods from Malaysia is
shipped in transit through Singapore with the ensuing confusion regarding the domi-
nant country of origin when the commodity or the service shall be classified at the entry
of the EU.
Since the EU has adopted a common external trade policy, operated at the suprana-
tional level, and where the concept of external trade between the member states has
been replaced by internal ‘transactions’ within the INTRASTAT framework, the ROO
issue is less relevant when it comes to establishing the correct country of origin in
13 See MSITS (2010), for an extensive discussion of these issues.
14 In extreme cases, the imports to the EU of a seemingly low-cost physical product from Southeast Asia, e.g.
a sports shoe, may contain a larger value-added from various service inputs as design, product development
etc., derived in Europe than the physical assembly of the product in Southeast Asia. Consequently, the import
tariff to the EU, motivated to protect European industry from outside competitors, is calculated from a gross
output value that is foremost derived from its own domestic production (National Board of Trade (Sweden)
2011, p. 10).
15 Defined by when the product in transit undergoes a minor transformation, e.g. re-packaging or re-branding
without a shift in statistical classification.
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Europe for imports to ASEAN, although it could be subject to different interpretations
at different import gateways of the Union. Each member country does still collect and
report external trade data for Balance of Payments Statistics purposes. The BOP routine
maintains the role of being the main source of service transactions of the EU, intra- as
well as extra-regionally (MSITS 2010).
Location of the service value added
The precise territorial location of value added, and, accordingly, the determination of
country of origin in an export transaction, is closely related to the application of rules of
origin, as mentioned above. Since statistics regarding trade in services are compiled
from companies, whose industry classification belong to the service sector, it is
assumed that service production and—trade is related to the formal, registered, location
of the surveyed firm. While the statistical bias regarding the location of service value
added in the manufacturing sector is related to its ‘embeddedness’ in the physical
production, the main problem in the service production is more connected to the degree
of mobility and the spatial flexibility of the service, as seen from both the producers’
and the consumers’ perspectives. A broad categorisation of various commercial ser-
vices with regard to the mobility concept can be made from the starting point of the
degree of dependence on physical infrastructure, in which tourism, transport,
maintenance/repair and trade-related services are related to a higher physical spatial
fixture, while most professional business services are not. Accordingly, in the moment
when the service is produced and instantly consumed, the consumer has been more
likely to cross the national border than the producer. On the other hand, most profes-
sional business services are highly mobile, both for producers and consumers, and are
in this respect rather subject to legal/formal regulations regarding production and
consumption, and in the next step, to cross-border transactions of either the production
or the consumption. It is therefore crucial to determine whether the service offered by
the foreign firm within the borders, in this case of Singapore, is eligible to national
standards or not. These restrictions are usually summarised under the framework of
technical barriers to trade.
Technical barriers to trade
While traditional tariff barriers, as well as non-tariff barriers like import quotas and
voluntary exports restraints, have been completely eliminated or substantially reduced
within the framework of the multilateral system, a large number of technical barriers to
trade still make considerable obstacles to trade liberalisation and are subject to the main
attention in the current FTA and EPA talks in different constellations around the world.
It could even be argued that TBTs have become even more important trade frictions
with the increasing complexities of products, and the introduction of higher ambitions
in trade practises, e.g. the imposing by the EU of unconditional demands on standards
concerning safety, sanitary/phytosanitary protection, environment, labour, human rights
etc. Since the service sector in general is underdeveloped when it comes to globally
accepted trade rules and practises, compared with agriculture and manufacturing,
services exhibit a large variety of local rules, originally aimed at the domestic market,
but which have become subject to interpretation by foreign competitors as a result of
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increasing internationalisation. In the Singaporean case, the most typical examples are
to be found in the banking and finance sector, recognition of foreign education, and
rules regarding intellectual property rights (Interviews with officials at the EU delega-
tion in Singapore, March 2010 and November 2014). The recent differences between
the EU and a number of Asian countries regarding the interpretation of the Information
Technology Agreement, adopted by the WTO in 1996, and extended in 2015, is another
example of how the measurement of the value of services complicates the operational
implementation of rules in international trade practises (WTO 2015a). The ITA has
been a pilot landmark agreement in putting together the physical products (hardware)
and the intellectual content of information technology products (software) within the
same trade policy framework. The two other examples of the plurilateral approach
within the WTO are the currently negotiated TiSA, and the Environmental Goods
Agreement (EGA).
In the EU context, a union-wide common technical harmonisation and
standardisation practice has certainly proceeded successfully during the last 25 years
within the general framework of the Single Internal Market, but many issues remain,
particularly related to the new member states, but also as a consequence of long
traditions of developing national standards and norms among the original members.
Another area that has attracted growing attention recently is the need for further
trade facilitation, where the gains from improved quality and reduced time of interna-
tional transfers are found to be substantial in the particular case of ASEAN (see, e.g.
Drzeniek Hanouz and Geiger 2010, p. 13, quoting several studies that confirm the
immediate need to carry out trade facilitation reforms in parallel to conventional trade
negotiations). This is another example of a problem that is also addressed at the
multilateral level, being one of the ‘Singapore Issues’ defined in the first WTO
Ministerial Meeting, held in Singapore, in 1996. The new Trade Facilitation Agreement
was adopted by the WTO General Council in 2014 and will come into force when two
thirds of the members have accepted it (WTO 2015b).16
Government procurement in the service sector
Government procurement practises can be seen as a special case in the monitoring of
technical barriers to trade. Rules and regulations related to public procurement in
services, e.g. healthcare, education, military etc., have for a long time been a notable
exception to trade liberalisation, and the level of national protection is usually far higher
than in the field of private business services. The ambition of the EU has been to
incorporate government procurement rules in the RTA/BTA negotiations with other
parties in order to open up domestic markets for foreign competition. This ambition has
also been in line with the multilateral talks, where global rules regarding government
procurement and competition policies in general became also ‘Singapore issues’ in
1996. The resistance among many countries to extend the GATS to comprise public
procurement has been widespread, and this issue has been, at least temporarily, pushed
aside in the DDA. The EU ambition, however, is to bring in rules regarding transpar-
ency, equal treatment of foreign competitors, and a control mechanism of observance of
16 Eight ASEAN members have at the time of writing (October 2016) accepted the Protocol of Amendment.
Notable exceptions are Indonesia and Philippines (http://wto.org)
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rules regarding public procurement in all free-trade negotiations. This standpoint has
also in the case of ASEAN countries been met with considerable resistance. The EU is
at the same time also accused of limiting the opportunities for free market competition
regarding procurement in the public sector in different member countries, e.g. due to
the use of government subsidies to uncompetitive industries, and regional policy
cohesion practises.
Empirical study
The interviews with representatives of public and private institutions were carried out to
establish which concrete issues could be expected in advance; next, which ones were
identified during the negotiations, how had they in such a case had been addressed, and,
finally, whether these disunities had been solved or remained in the final compromise.
These interviews took place between 2007 and 2014, i.e. both in the initial phases of
the negotiations, and after the conclusion of the final deal. The interviews with the
private companies, representing different sectors within service industries, aimed
thereafter to verify solved or unsolved problems at the business level within respective
industry, and took place in November–December 2014, i.e. after the concluded deal,
but before the agreement’s entry into force. The business actors were categorised along
two dimensions, namely their degree of dependence on a domestic physical infrastruc-
ture to carry out the service, and the degree of being restrained by domestic regulations
regarding this particular service (see Fig. 3). Nine out of the thirteen respondents were
dependent on a local physical infrastructure to a relatively low degree, and, thus highly
mobile regarding their own location. The main purpose of being located in Singapore
was to offer a service to local customers and not to provide for exports to the EU. In this
respect, the result of the EUSFTA negotiations were claimed to have little direct
importance for them, but indirectly more relevant in terms of a gradual relief of
domestic regulations, constituting various technical barriers to trade. As had already
Fig. 3 Categorisation of interviewed service companies
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been established in the interviews with the official actors, Singapore keeps few
important technical barriers to trade, why harmonisation and standardisation were not
big issues. The major prevailing barriers, which were also not solved in the agreement,
were identified within the financial sector, and regarding the lack of completely mutual
acceptance of professional qualifications. These restraints were confirmed by the
interviews with financial actors and in talent management, but were at the same time
treated pragmatically, since these restrictions had existed already at the time of estab-
lishment, and a sufficient niche of business could be conducted within these limits
anyway. The Singaporean education system is better fit for solving barriers regarding
technical consultants, than in general management consultancy. Local presence and
close connections to customers, both domestic and foreign originated, were considered
to be crucial, regardless of existing and potentially reduced technical barriers. The
majority of clients were still foreign with an overrepresentation of the home-countries
of the responding service firms, but the shares of domestic and Asian clients were
increasing. All business respondents looked positively forward to the agreement to be
implemented, but saw relatively few direct short-term benefits of the deal. Instead, a
future interregional EU-ASEAN agreement, using the EUSFTA as the minimum level
of reciprocal legislation, was considered to have a much larger potential impact on their
business, since the opportunity to use Singapore as a hub for offering knowledge-
intensive business services to other ASEAN members remained limited by the existing
barriers, and the majority of the respondents had been forced to create parallel local
companies in other member states in order to avoid these barriers. A large technical/
engineering consultant firm had opened their office in Singapore in 1991 in order to
serve the entire ASEAN region. Yet, they do still have projects in countries where they
do not have an office; in that case they conduct the planning work in their office in an
ASEAN member state outside Singapore by using local partners and following the
domestic regulations in the location of the project. The customers also require this
proximity: [Even] ‘… those who have been our customers for 20–30 years, still
stipulate the planning to be done at the site. They want to control it ...’, according to
this firm.
The location of a hub in Singapore was also convenient for personal and logistical
reasons, in terms of the school system, flight connections etc. Even though IPR charges
represent the sector with the largest deficit in the bilateral balance with the EU, those
respondents who had experiences of these issues did not see them as problems; some
did specifically compare Singapore favourably to other countries in Asia, particularly
India and Mainland China.
The four respondents which were categorised as more dependent on a local physical
infrastructure to conduct and to offer business services in Singapore, i.e. within the
transport and maritime repair/maintenance sector, were, not surprisingly, less concerned
with any significant technical barriers to trade; if they were, they should presumably not
be present at all. They were also more active in offering services to customers outside
Singapore within ASEAN and to other countries in East Asia. They did also emphasise
the active engagement by Singapore’s government to construct rules that made the local
establishment of a business hub more attractive. Two global European manufacturing
companies among the respondents run sales/service/administrative units in Singapore
with the objective to grow in the maintenance business. Maintenance is regarded an
important business area for which they must be locally present, and most of the
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customers are local companies. Therefore they run in parallel units in at least five other
ASEAN countries.
In this context, it was also noted by several respondents, official actors as well as the
private firms, that if the TPP comes into force, there are uncertainties regarding how to
interpret the relations between those ASEAN states, including Singapore, which are TPP
members, and those, which are not, in a case if and when TPP comes into force before an
EUSFTA. The slowly proceeding deepening integration process within ASEAN/AFTA,
specifically the AEC 2015 scheme, was alsomentioned, but was not expectedwith too high
optimism. Potential problems regarding effects of the WTO-orchestrated TiSA negotia-
tions, in which Singapore is not a partner, but the EU is, were not particularly mentioned,
and obviously at this stage being too esoteric to pay attention to at the business level.
Several respondents stressed that a global WTO solution would be the best option, but the
problem is its slowness. One respondent argued that ‘... the 500 FTAs are something that
nobody can grasp. They do not have any kind of guiding effect that they should have’.
To sum up, all business respondents adopted a reactive rather than a proactive
attitude to the EUSFTA. They were fairly well familiar with the deal and its potential,
as well as with other trade policy talks in the region. Some were also participating in
interest- and lobby organisations, to keep informed about ongoing discussions, but
were rather adapting an ‘ad-hoc’ attitude to various technical barriers to trade, in order
to find pragmatic solutions. The awareness among firms of the various FTAs seems to
have increased during the last decade, as earlier studies indicated lower responsiveness
of firms to the FTAs than the more recent ones (Kawai and Wignaraja 2011b; Kettunen
2012; Wignaraja 2015, p. 194). With the exception of a few limited areas, the business
climate in Singapore was considered to be better than in most other parts of the world,
why an EUSFTA taken into force could rather be seen as a normative ‘spearhead’ for
other deals, in which respect an EU-ASEAN agreement was seen as an important step,
particularly in order to strengthen Singapore’s role as a regional hub for service trade.
Conclusion
The paper has taken its departure at the increased significance of service trade in the
global economic development. From being considered a less-important part of world
trade and FDI, services are now considered crucial for sustaining and developing
economic growth in mature, as well as in emerging markets. However, much is still
to be done within the field of service trade agreements, and underlying national
differences complicate the possibility to reach multilateral agreements and to develop
the intentions of the GATS and in the current TiSA negotiations. In this context, the
proliferation of various kinds of preferential trade agreements—bilateral, regional and
interregional—can be seen as a sign of acknowledging the economic importance of
services in the transformation of mature and emerging markets in the absence of a
completion of the Doha Development Agenda, since they at the same time also reach
levels beyond what can be agreed multilaterally. The soon to be realised EU-Singapore
FTA reflects the willingness to push these issues forward in relation to the overall
economic importance of trade and FDI. This endeavour is also related to the economic
relationship between Singapore and the rest of ASEAN, as well as with Japan, China
and other countries in the region, and to the recently concluded, but not yet ratified TPP
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agreement. The UK decision to initiate an exit from the EU will indeed add to
uncertainty regarding its future role in international service trade, both regionally
between the UK and EU, and globally within a TiSA framework. The firm-level
perspective will be of great importance in relation to location strategy in Asia in order
to build competitive advantage. UK firms have traditionally been able to utilise their
close relationship with Singapore as a location-specific advantage in the knowledge-
intensive business service industry development in Asia. However, all major players are
eager to develop a mutually beneficial relationship for future service-related growth.
Singapore is an important case, since its government has worked hard to establish the city
state as a service and knowledge hub, in competition with other cities in the region.
Favourable location-specific factors in combinationwith a strong institutional environment
seem to be particularly positive for attracting service FDI. The difficulty of measuring the
value added within services makes further case study of the sectors increasingly relevant
(Hamanaka 2011a, b). The complexity of services embedded in production networks also
calls for these kinds of studies. Interviews with trade officials at both parties confirm that
this agreement is seen as a pilot case for future ‘WTO-plus’ agreements, going beyond
trade in goods, through the inclusion of investment, all kinds of services, public procure-
ment, competition policy and trade facilitation issues. Interviews with respondents from
different service sectors at the company level confirmed that most firms have so far
adopted a passive and reactive attitude, playing a waiting-game, and are maintaining an
‘ad-hoc’ approach to rules and regulations that may change to the better after the
implementation of the agreement. Despite a general confusion regarding which of several
overlapping and partly contradictory PTAs to take advantage of in a separate business
transaction, most companies tended to turn such an uncertainty into a competitive advan-
tage by jumping between different existing agreements in order to benefit from the best
option in each separate case. Such a strategy requires, though, a better insight and a more
profound legal interpretation of the different agreements than the normal service business
firm possesses, why the real benefits from such a strategy are limited. The key difference
between service sub-sectors and their ability to take advantage of the realisation of the EU-
Singapore FTA is furthermore related to their dependence of local infrastructure, and their
mobility between different geographic locations in order to provide the service. It was
further confirmed that even though Singapore represents a highly liberalised trade and
investment régime, there are a number of technical barriers to trade remaining, not only in
direct trade with Singapore, but to an even larger extent in entrepôt transactions with other
ASEANmembers and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region (cf. Hill andMenon 2014,
p. 19; Wignaraja 2015, p. 194). The service sector lags behind manufacturing when it
comes to mutually acceptable comprehensive rules in the day-to-day practises. In partic-
ular, various business services that today are encapsulated in a physical product, but
nevertheless account for a major share of the compound value added of the final product,
need more attention and regulation in future comprehensive free-trade agreements, regard-
less of whether they represent the multilateral or the regional/interregional level.
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-How long time in Singapore;
-Number of employees: expatriates/locals.
*Production and trade.
-Main reasons for locating in Singapore;
-Other activities within ASEAN; Singapore as a hub;
-Service imports, value added in Singapore, sales/customers in Singapore, service
exports;
-Countries of origin, countries of purchase, countries of sales, countries of final
consumption; (ASEAN, Other AsPac, EU, USA).
-Relation to manufacturing: imports, services embedded in manufactured products
for domestic sales and/or exports.
*External trade environment.
-Knowledge about EUSFTA, other Singapore FTAs, TPP, TTIP, China-ASEAN etc.
*Technical barriers to trade.
-Problems related to imports/exports;
-Problems related to domestic rules and regulations;
-Mental barriers;
-Potential improvements after EUSFTA implementation.
*Location advantages.
-Incentives for location/expansion in Singapore;
-Business search (suppliers, customers, competitors);
-Support from public sector, universities etc.;
-Singapore in relation to ASEAN, China, AsPac;
-Prospects/threats at short/middle-term.
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